In this paper we study the joint behavior of the federal funds rate and 10-year TIPS yields before the start of the financial crisis in 2007. We make three points. First, the decade before the crisis was characterized by a collapse in the yield on TIPS. Second, estimated VARs for the federal funds rate and the TIPS yield show that while monetary policy shocks had negligible effects on the TIPS yield, shocks to the latter had one-to-one effects on the federal funds rate. Third, these findings can be rationalized in a New Keynesian model.
Introduction
Many observers have contended that too expansionary monetary policy set the stage for the financial crisis that erupted in August 2007. Under this argument, low short-term nominal interest rates led financial institutions to raise leverage and provided investors with incentives to hold riskier assets, including structured products, which promised higher returns at supposedly little extra risk. 1 However, while policy-controlled interest rates were undoubtedly low in the years before the crisis, the issue is whether they were too low given the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Taylor (2007 Taylor ( , 2008 argues that the federal funds rate was set much below that suggested by the Taylor rule, which previously appeared to have had good stabilizing properties for the US economy. Similarly, Lombardi and Sgherri (2007) Bernanke (2010) expresses a conflicting view and shows that US monetary policy was not unusually expansionary in the years before the crisis, given the weakness of the economy after the collapse of the "dot-com" bubble earlier in the decade. Furthermore, he shows that housing prices were rising unexpectedly rapidly, given the state of the macro economy and the stance of monetary policy, before the crisis erupted. This suggests that some other factors must have played a role triggering the house price bubble. Bernanke (2010) argues that changes in the menu of mortgage finance products played a role in the rapid growth of house prices.
However, there are other possible explanations. 3 In particular, Bernanke (2005) suggests that savings-investment imbalances led to a decline in long-term real interest rates across the world. If so, this would have depressed nominal interest rates along the yield curve and generated relatively low mortgage interest rates, given the level of the federal funds rate. In related work, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) show that the initial fall in real interest rates in the 2000-2005 period is more closely related to the end of the productivity boom of the 1990s than to shifts in the investment-saving balance. Similarly, Justiniano and Primiceri (2010) provide evidence of a substantial decline in the natural interest rate after the 2000 peak and argue that monetary policy was not too loose in the 2002-2006 period. 4 In this paper we shed further light on the potential role of monetary policy in the run-up to the financial crisis by studying the relationship between the federal funds rate, as a measure of the stance of monetary policy, and long-term real (indexed) yields. Our starting point is the observation that the decline of long-term real interest before the crisis is likely to have stimulated the demand for long-lived assets, in particular housing which is highly interest sensitive, and raised their prices. Thus, if monetary policy did depress long-term real interest rates, it would have helped set the stage for the crisis. By contrast, if long-term real interest rates moved independently of policy-controlled interest rates, or if they induced changes in policy-controlled interest rates, then it would throw doubts on the hypothesis that monetary policy played a key role in setting the stage for the crisis.
To preview our findings, we argue that both some simple evidence from a monetary policy VAR and simulations of the canonical New Keynesian model suggest that policy rates reacted to the decline in the long-term real interest rates. To interpret that argument, we note that macroeconomic theory holds that monetary policy has at most temporary real effects. While it can depress short-term real interest rates, the expectations hypothesis of the term structure implies that it must be expected to do so for a considerable period of time in order to have a material impact on long-term real interest rates. It therefore seems implausible that monetary policy can explain the persistent fall in long-term real yields. Simply put, it seems improbable that reductions in the federal funds rate -a nominal overnight rate -can have depressed 10-year real interest rates over a decade.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the relationship between policy-controlled short-term nominal interest rates and marketdetermined long real yields from the perspective of the literature. In Section 3 we provide some simple empirical evidence that suggests that while monetary policy shocks have little effect on long-term real interest rates, the opposite is not true. In Section 4 we study a simple New Keynesian model and conclude that our empirical results are compatible with a model in which shocks to the natural real interest rates play an important role in the determination of policy-controlled short-term interest rates. Section 5 concludes.
Short nominal vs. long-term real interest rates
We start the analysis by reviewing the behavior of the federal funds rate and the yield on 10-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), which we use to assess the behavior of long-term real yields. We study the period from January 1999, when the TIPS data begin, to July 2007, that is, the last month before the crisis started. Figure 1 shows that the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy in the late 1990s as the "dot-com" bubble formed. After the crash in 2000, it cut the federal funds rate aggressively and maintained it at 1% until June 2004, when interest rates were gradually increased to reach 5.25% in June 2006.
Despite these large cyclical variations in the federal funds rate, the TIPS yield does not seem to respond. Rather, there is a gradual decline of long-term real interest rates from about 4% in 2000 to around 2% in 2005, after which they rose somewhat towards the end of the sample. That said, there is some low-frequency correlation between the two interest rates in that both are relatively high in 2000, decline towards 2004, and rise subsequently. However, that correlation may be explained by changes in monetary policy that impact on long-term real interest rates or by changes in long-term real interest rates that induce monetary policy responses. A number of authors have estimated the natural real interest rate, or the Wicksellian interest rate, which is defined as the interest rate consistent with output at potential and inflation stable and which plays an important role in the determination of long-term interest rates. It provides the benchmark for the appropriate level of monetary policy rates in New Keynesian models: if real policy rates are below (above) the natural level, output will increase (decrease), inducing pressures for inflation to rise (fall). The natural interest rate is not constant but it fluctuates in response to a variety of shocks to preferences and technology that impact on the economy. While it is not observable, it can be estimated. Justiniano and Primiceri (2010) estimate the real interest rates gap for the period 1962-2008. They focus their attention on the evolution of the short-term real interest rates gap, defined as the difference between the current ex-ante real interest rate and the natural interest rate, and the long-term real interest rates gap, defined as the sum of the current and expected future short-term real interest rates gaps. They find that, for the 2002-2006 period, while the short-term real interest rates gap was negative, supporting the view that monetary policy was loose, the long-term real interest rates gap was positive. Since long-term real interest rates are more important than short-term rates for the demand for longlived assets, in particular housing, this finding casts doubt on the hypothesis that the low long-term real interest rates observed before the crisis were due to monetary policy being too expansionary.
Similarly, Laubach and Williams (2003) apply a Kalman filter to estimate the natural rates of interest, output and trend growth rate for the US in the period . Their estimates show a significant variation of the natural interest rate, with changes in the trend growth being an important determinant. These results support the view that the natural interest rate varies over time in response to shifts to preferences and to the growth rate of output as suggested by theory. However, the authors note that the estimates of the neutral real rate are imprecise and subject to considerable real-time mismeasurement. Clark and Kozicki (2004) also estimate the equilibrium real rate in real time, using US data from 1983 to 2004. Exploring various models, they conclude that the historical mean of the real rate or the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of trend growth is a more accurate estimate of the equilibrium rate than modelbased real-time estimates, as also pointed out by Laubach and Williams (2003) .
In this paper we do not attempt to estimate the long-term natural interest rate. Instead, we note, as we show more formally in our theoretical analysis below, that the long-term real interest rate is related to the sum of current and expected natural real interest rates. A negative shock to the long-term real interest rates can thus be interpreted as reflecting a persistent decline in the natural interest rate. This suggests that the yields on TIPS, which can be seen as proxying the long real interest rates, contain information about natural real interest rates. Hence, in the VAR analysis below we estimate the effect of a shock to TIPS, interpreting it as reflecting a persistent shock to the natural interest rate, on the current policy rate.
A VAR analysis
Before turning to our theoretical analysis, we estimate a four-variable VAR that comprises the growth rate over 12 months of a Coincident Economic Activity Index, as a measure of real economic conditions, the core personal consumption deflator, the federal funds rate and the yield on 10-year TIPS, as a measure of the real interest rate. We ask two questions. First, did the cuts in the federal funds rate depress long-term real yields? Second, how did the decline in the long-term real yields impact on the federal funds rate?
Identification
We identify the shocks using a standard recursive scheme. Following the bulk of the large VAR literature on the monetary transmission mechanism, we order the federal funds rate, the monetary policy instrument, after economic activity and inflation.
5 Thus, we assume that changes in the federal funds rate do not impact on economic activity or inflation instantaneously. This is plausible because the large literature on the monetary transmission mechanism shows that the effects of monetary policy on the economy are only felt after a long lag.
While this identification strategy is standard in a monetary policy VAR comprising economic activity, inflation and a monetary policy instrument, the presence of the long indexed interest rate in our model complicates identification of the monetary policy shock. Financial markets typically react immediately to new information since it may help predict future returns on a wide range of financial assets. Consequently, one would expect that the long-term real interest rate reacts to monetary policy shocks. Indeed, Beechey and Wright (2009) find that 5-and 10-year TIPS yields rise in response to a tightening of monetary policy.
6 This suggests that it is appropriate to order the federal funds rate before the TIPS yield. It should be noted that this assumption maximizes the explanatory power of monetary policy for long-term real yields since it attributes any contemporaneous correlation between the two variables to monetary policy.
However, real-side news embodied in the long-term real interest rate may also lead to changes in the monetary policy rate. This suggests ordering the longterm real yield before the federal funds rate. That said, it is of course possible that in practice the choice of identifying ordering is of little relevance, as would be the case if there is little correlation between innovations in the equations for the federal funds rate and the TIPS yields. In the present case, the residuals are virtually orthogonal so the choice of ordering is irrelevant. Not surprisingly, the highest correlation, 0.07, is between the innovations of the federal funds rate and the yield on TIPS.
Estimation
Estimation is done on monthly data from January 1999 to July 2007 using a VAR(4) specification as suggested by Akaike and Schwartz information criteria, tests for lag length and for serial correlation of the residuals. We incorporated dummies to account for effects of the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001 and to account for "Y2K."
5 See Bernanke and Blinder (1992) for a discussion of how to identify monetary policy shocks in VAR models. 6 Interestingly, the inflation component falls, dampening the overall effect on the nominal interest rate.
Preliminary analysis indicated that all variables are non-stationary but cointegrated. As a consequence, it is appropriate to estimate the system in levels, treating it as an unrestricted version of the vector-error correction model that is implied by the presence of cointegration. 7 Figure 2 shows the impulse responses arising from the VAR. In the interest of brevity, we show only the responses of the federal funds rate and the yield on 10-year TIPS to monetary policy shocks and shocks to the yield on TIPS. In the upper-left corner we see that a monetary policy shock raises the federal funds rate immediately by about 10 basis points and that the effect increases for about 6 months before the rate gradually falls and returns to zero after about 18 months. In the lower left-hand side we see that the yield on 10-year TIPS does not respond to the tightening of monetary policy, supporting the notion that monetary policy has no permanent effect on real variables. The lower right-hand panel shows that the responses of the yield on 10-year TIPS to real interest rate shocks are highly persistent: the yield on TIPS rises by about 15 basis points immediately and remains 5 basis points above the initial level after 2 years. More interestingly, the upper-right panel of the figure indicates that after a shock to the TIPS yield, the federal funds rates rises gradually and reaches about 10 basis points after 10 months. Subsequently it falls slowly and reaches a level about 5 basis points above the initial level after 2 years.
Before proceeding we emphasize that these findings are obtained using monthly data. Beechey and Wright (2009) show that monetary policy surprises have a significant effect on the 5-and 10-year TIPS, but not on the 5-10 year forward TIPS, when using intraday data. In contrast, using daily data, as in Gür-kaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) , the results are not statistically significant for 10-year TIPS; they are statistically significant but have the opposite sign for the 5-year TIPS and they are significant only at the 10% level for the 5-10 year forward.
Overall, we interpret our findings and those of Beechey and Wright (2009) as indicating that while monetary policy shocks may impact on long-term real yields at the shortest of time horizons, they have no effect at time horizons relevant for the macro economy. Instead, shocks to long-term real interest rates seem to induce one-to-one responses of the short nominal interest rate after some period of time. In turn, this suggests that monetary policy played little role in setting the stage for the crisis by depressing long-term real rates. Next we interpret these findings from the perspective of theory.
A New Keynesian model
Since Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) show that long indexed yields fell across the world in the year prior to the crisis, in the interest of brevity we think of the world as a closed economy. While this does allow us to study short and long, nominal and real interest rates that are the focus of this paper, it does not permit us to study regional current account imbalances.
Following Woodford (2003) , we refer to the (one-period) natural real interest rate as the Wicksellian interest rate and analyze how a shock to it impacts on the short-term interest rate set by the central bank, the long-term real interest rate, the inflation rate and the output gap. Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2005) use a two-sector DGE model to analyze the effects of permanent changes in trend productivity growth and conclude that a central bank should raise interest rates after a positive shock to productivity when it is perceived as permanent, while it should lower them when it is temporary. Here we take a short cut and present the effects of a persistent change in the natural real interest rate which embeds the expectations of the future natural level of output (in a detrended environment).
We consider the canonical three-equation New Keynesian model. First, we use the hybrid version of the Phillips curve as in Gali and Gertler (1999) 
This model captures the two monetary policy mistakes discussed in the introduction. Interest rates can be set too low, given inflation and the output gap, in the sense that there is a series of large, negative n-shocks. Alternatively, policy makers may fail to perceive a temporary, but persistent, μ-shock to the Wicksellian interest rate.
8 Gali and Gertler (1999) assume that a fraction θ of firms, labeled "backward looking," use a simple rule of thumb that is based on the recent pricing behavior of the firms' competitors. 9 κ = (σ+η)(1-ω)(1-ωβ)φ -1 and φ = ω+θ[1-ω(1-β)], where σ and η are, respectively, the consumption and the labor elasticity of substitution, (1-ω) is the fraction of firms that adjust their prices in any given period assuming Calvo price setting, and β is the discount factor. We assume logarithmic utility function, a fraction of 40% of backward looking price setters [as in Gali and Gertler (1999) among others] and a fraction of 20% of the firms adjusting their prices in any given period. 10 Note that in a model without technology shocks, the Wicksellian interest rate depends entirely on the exogenous shock. Figure 3 shows the effect of a negative n-shock. We assume that the shock obeys an AR(1) process with a parameter of 0.5, as in Walsh (2010) . In response, the output gap and inflation rise. A monetary policy error of the Taylor type should thus be associated with a booming economy. Since such a shock has only a temporary effect on real variables, it does not depress the long-term real interest rate much.
Next we review the effects of a negative shock to the Wicksellian interest. Since the shock is highly persistent in the VAR analysis we assume that the autocorrelation coefficient is 0.95.
10 Figure 4 presents the impulse response functions.
Since aggregate demand depends on the difference between expected one-period real interest rate and the Wicksellian interest rate, 1 , t t t t i E r π + − − the fall in the latter implies that monetary policy has become contractionary. This leads to a drop in the output gap and inflation. In response, the central bank cuts the nominal interest rate to prevent the further decline in the output gap and the inflation rate. The long-term real interest rate, which is given by the sum of expected future one-period rates, drops on impact by a fraction of the initial drop in the nominal interest rate.
11
These results show that a persistent and unexpected decline in the Wicksellian interest rate will slow the economy, reduce inflation pressures and lead monetary policy makers to cut interest rates. In many ways, that resembles the macro situation in the US in the early 2000s in which inflation pressures seemed to abate unexpectedly and increasingly lower interest rates were called for in the 2001-2004 period to forestall inflation falling too low.
Conclusions
The focus of this paper is the observation that long-term real interest rates, as measured by the yield on 10-year TIPS, collapsed in the decade before the financial crisis. Our empirical and theoretical analysis suggests that this fall was associated with a fall in the Wicksellian interest rate. In response, the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate to prevent inflation from falling too low. The alternative view that monetary policy triggered a fall in long-term real yields seems difficult to reconcile with the VAR findings and the New Keynesian model studied here. Moreover, it suggests that inflation should have been unexpectedly high in the period before the crisis, not unusually low as noted by many observers.
Of course, while we argue that monetary policy responded to real side developments, we do not deny that low short-term interest rates did play an important role in the crisis by providing an unexpectedly strong boost to financial markets activity, as suggested in the analysis of Rajan (2005) . Unfortunately, central banks and other regulators appear to have vastly underestimated the risks to financial stability arising from low interest rates, even if warranted by macroeconomic considerations. 
